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Abstract 
Since the mid-1960s, the Japanese cotton spinning industry has experienced steady 
decline. However, the whole process of this decline was the synthesis of several 
different firm strategies within the industry. If we look at this process, three types of 
firm strategies can be found; (1) positive restructuring from textiles to non-textiles 
(Kanebo, Nittobo, and Nisshinbo), (2) adherence to textile manufacturing (three 
shinbo: Kondobo, Tsuzukibo and Omikenshi), and (3) inactive restructuring in some 
large companies (such as Toyobo). 
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The Restructuring of Cotton Spinning Companies in Postwar Japan 
Takeshi Abe 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the process of restructuring of Japanese cotton spinning 
companies after the Second World War. This research is divided into three stages to consider the 
features of this particular sector; that is, the High-Growth Era (1955-1973); the long depression from 
the first Oil Crisis in 1973 to the mid-1980s; and the Bubble Economy (1987-1990) and its aftermath. 
This article will focus especially on the first and second stages. 
 
    According to the ranking lists of the total assets of Japan’s top one hundred companies in 1955, 
sixteen companies belonged to the textile industry; and of those, ten were cotton spinning companies.  
Toyobo, Kanebo, and Dai Nihonbo ranked, respectively, the eighth, eleventh and twelfth in this list. 
However, in 1990 only three firms in the textile industry were left on the list, and among the cotton 
spinners only Kanebo (at 88th) was found there1.  Although Japanese textile firms, particularly cotton 
spinners, were proud of their strong competitive advantage in the world market until the early 1960s, 
after this period they lost that advantage and began to decline. But the decline of Japanese cotton 
textiles was a mild, slow and long-term process, which signified that the industry had persistent 
countervailing power against the developed countries. 
 
    Japan’s industrialization started in the early 20th century led by such labor-intensive industries as 
textiles and mining. But the remarkable development of the heavy industries, such as metals, 
machinery, and chemicals had to wait until the 1960s, though it had begun to develop during and after 
the First World War. On the other hand, the textile industry in the pre-First World War period mainly 
consisted of cotton and silk. Silk reeling and sericulture were heavily damaged during the Great 
Depression after 1929. However, in contrast to this sector, cotton spinning and weaving maintained 
their top position in the world and even in 1933 surpassed the cloth exports of Lancashire (UK) in 
volume2. And in spite of its total destruction after the Second World War, the Japanese cotton industry 
was miraculously reconstructed in about 1950 and retained its powerful position in production and 
exports until the early 1960s3. 
    In pre-war days, the Japanese cotton industry was composed of several different firm groups. The 
first group was the large spinning companies. Each company had modern machinery in many factories, 
and the larger companies within this group integrated weaving and finishing. In particular, the big three 
of Toyobo4, Kanebo, and Dai Nihonbo, became among the biggest such businesses in the world5.  The 
second group was the many small- and medium-sized independent weaving firms in the local sanchi 
(producing centers). Most sanchi weavers, by introducing the factory system and mechanized power 
looms, could survive the cutthroat competition of the long depression after the First World War. 
Consequently, they coexisted with the integrated large weaving mills in the first group through the 
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segmentation of cloths, and became the consumer of 60 or 70 per cent of the cotton yarn spun by the 
spinning companies.  The third group was the various merchants, most of whom dealt in yarn and 
cloth, while some large ones imported raw cotton from countries such as India and the USA.  Such a 
functional industrial structure and the respective firms’ or sanchi’s’ efforts to improve the quality of 
products and cost cutting, brought about the industry’s powerful competitive advantage. After the 
Second World War, while these three groups still remained, the fourth group, apparel firms (including 
not only manufacturers but also distributors), emerged in accordance with the downstream 
development of knitting, sewing, and designing. Among these four groups, this chapter will 
concentrate on the pillar of the Japanese cotton industry – the spinning companies. 
 
1 Changes in the Japanese cotton spinning industry in wartime and the postwar occupation 
period 
The Japanese cotton industry reached its zenith in the mid-1930s.  However, as the Japanese 
economy was rapidly reorganized for war after 1937, the industry was put under direct government 
regulations. At first, the regulations were limited within such fields as price control and the 
enforcement of mixed yarn spinning with raw cotton and rayon staple fibre. But in July 1938, the use 
of imported raw cotton was restricted for the production for export goods, and as a result only rayon 
staple fibre was used for domestic textiles for daily wear. Through this process, the cotton industry 
was drastically re-organized.  On the one hand, spinning companies were allotted raw cotton by the 
Japanese government. On the other, sanchi weavers became solely sub-contractors for spinning 
companies, and trading companies were also transformed into only a part of the governmental 
network of distribution. In order to allot the scarce foreign exchanges into the strategic heavy 
weapons industries, the cotton industry, which had consumed much imported raw cotton, came to be 
deemed a useless one. In the early 1940s, spinning companies were often horizontally integrated by 
the government. And the total number of firms, which had been sixty or seventy in the interwar 
period, decreased. Finally, ten large companies were established in 19436, and each of which had 
respectively about one million spindles. Around the end of the war, they were obliged to deliver most 
of the spindles and looms to the government as the materials for weapons, and many spinning and 
weaving mills became the factories producing aircrafts or ships. 
 
The defeat of Japan in August 1945 did not change the situation of the Japanese cotton industry in 
a favourable direction. The spinning companies had lost four-fifths of ten million spindles through the 
delivery of machinery to the government.  They were worried about the shortage of raw cotton, 
electricity and workers, most of whom returned to their homeland in order to secure food. 
Hyperinflation was also a heavy blow for the companies. Consequently, they faced severe difficulties 
in producing yarn and cloth during the postwar period. 
 
However, the US government, which had amassed huge surpluses of raw cotton under the New 
Deal in the Great Depression, was seeking a market and noticed that the Japanese cotton industry was 
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potentially a good consumer. The US government started to ship old raw cotton to Japan in June 1946. 
In addition, between December 1946 and February 1947 the General Headquarters of Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) publicly permitted that the former ten large spinning 
companies could have spinning and weaving machines. About four million spindles were permitted, of 
which the ten companies had 3,680,000, with the difference (340,000 spindles) being allotted to 
twenty-five newly-founded companies (shinbo7). Amongst these were such dynamic companies as 
Kondobo, Tsuzukibo and Omikenshi. Nevertheless, it was not until 1950 that Japanese cotton spinning 
firms began enlarging their facilities. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the upper 
limit of four million spindles was immediately removed. The industry dramatically developed within a 
year, adding many new entrants called shin-shinbo8 during this itohen (textile-related) boom. 
 
The Japanese cotton industry was, however, thrown into turmoil earlier than any other industry, as 
overproduction and excess equipment became a serious problem. The Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI), established in 1949, tried to solve this problem by allowing the cotton spinners to 
refrain from expanding their investment into fixed capital through the allotment system of foreign 
exchanges relating to the import of raw cotton. In addition, MITI began to adopt the method of 
Kankoku Sotan, by which the ministry ‘recommended’ the curtailment of operation not to the whole 
cotton spinning industry (via the Japan Spinners’ Association) but to each of the spinning companies. 
This encouraged the spread of cartel activity that evaded the regulation of Anti-Trust Act in 1947, and 
was later to appear in other industries besides spinning. The first Kankoku Sotan continued between 
April 1952 and May 1953, indicating that the problem of overproduction or excess capacity became 
apparent in the early 1950s. In this period, the Japanese cotton spinning industry became a genuinely 
mature industry.9 
 
2 Decline in the Japanese cotton spinning industry 
Japan’s cotton industry soon recovered from the slump of the early 1950s, and increased production 
and exports. Between 1955 and 1970, the volume of cotton fabric production was kept at over 2.5 
billion square meters. Although Japanese cotton spinning companies were often worried about the 
short depressions in the High-Growth Era, the cartel activities led by MITI eased their minds. Kankoku 
Sotan was instituted twice; first between May 1955 and June 1956, and second between April 1958 and 
July 1960. Additional curtailment of operation was conducted twice; first between August 1960 and 
March 1962, and then between April 1962 and September 1964. Because of these interventions, the 
Japanese cotton industry was able to survive until 1964.  
 
  The real crisis of the industry appeared in the depression of 1965.  Kankoku Sotan, by which 
MITI could regulate the supply of raw cotton to cotton spinners, had already lost its impact after the 
deregulation on raw cotton imports in 1961. Nevertheless, after the promulgation of the Revised 
Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment Law in 1964, a ‘depression cartel’ actually 
operated in cotton spinning as an exception to the Anti-Trust Act; first between October 1965 and 
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March 1966,  second between April and December 1966, and finally between January and March 
1967. After 1971, when the appreciation of the yen started under the pressure of US President Nixon’s 
‘New Economic Policy’, the volume of cotton fabric production decreased. In addition, the first Oil 
Crisis further aggravated the situation, and a ‘depression cartel’ was again organized between January 
and April 1975, and between April 1977 and June 1978. Finally, in 1985, when the Plaza Agreement 
was signed and the yen drastically appreciated, cotton fabric production became less than 2 billion 
square metres, and dwindled quickly thereafter. In 1995, only 1 billion square metres was produced. 
 
  In 1955, in the initial stage of the High-Growth Era, Japan’s exports of textiles also prospered. 
The data shows that although the largest export item was iron/steel (12.9%), it was followed by cotton 
cloth (11.5%), and third was rayon filament and rayon staple (7.2%). The volume of exported cotton 
fabric from Japan remained at 1 billion square metres between 1956 and 1963. But after the depression 
around 1965, the volume quickly reduced. In contrast, imports, which were negligible in the 1950s, 
increased remarkably after the 1960s. The years when Japan became a net importer in volume for 
certain textile goods are as follows; silk yarn in 1966, cotton yarn in 1967, natural fibre yarn including 
cotton, silk, hemp and wool in 1970, silk fabric in 1970, total of natural fibre fabric in 1978, cotton 
fabric in 1984, and total of yarn including man-made fibre in 1987. Therefore, before the end of the 
High-Growth Era, the Japanese cotton industry had already lost its competitive advantage. 
 
    In this contraction, most Japanese cotton spinning and weaving firms were obliged to reduce their 
facilities and workers. The number of workers is shown on Figure 1, and the number of cotton 
spinning companies also diminished as follows: 134 in 1955, 93 in 1973, 84 in 1980, and 72 in 1985.  
 
    The textile industry of the Asian countries, which used to be the largest export market for Japan’s 
cotton industry in the prewar years, developed spectacularly after the Second World War and soon 
accomplished import substitution. Consequently, as shown in Table 1, Japan’s textile industry 
gradually shifted its export markets from Asian to advanced countries, such as the US and the Western 
European countries.  
 
However, harsh criticism from the US government with regard to the inflow of Japan’s cheap 
garments (‘one dollar blouses’) was already apparent in 1955 and MITI ordered the Japanese cotton 
firms to accept ‘spontaneous restraint’ (Jishu Kisei) on cotton goods exports to the US, with the firms 
finally agreeing to the proposition within a year. This measure prevented the expansion of Japan’s 
exports of cotton goods to the US. In contrast to exports, which rapidly increased from 28 million 
square metres [m.s.ms.] in 1953 to 117 m.s.ms. in 1955, the volume of exports of Japanese cotton 
fabrics to the US dropped to 102 m.s.ms in 1956 and to 68 m.s.ms. in 1957. After the introduction of 
this policy, only in 1962 and between 1965 and 1969 did exports surpass 100 m.s.ms. before 198510. 
Between 1969 and 1972 the US again attacked the Japanese textile industry, because it was concerned 
about the inflow of woolen and synthetic textiles (not cotton goods). To solve this conflict, MITI and 
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the Japanese textile industry finally accepted further Jishu Kisei11. On the other hand, the US 
government succeeded in enforcing a Short-term Arrangement (STA) and a Long-term Arrangement 
(LTA) at the international conferences on cotton products organized by GATT in 1961, which aimed to 
regulate strictly the imports of cotton goods from the advanced countries to the US, while the US 
government helped the developing areas to export cotton products. In 1974, with political assistance 
from the EC countries, the US government also succeeded in enforcing a Multifiber Arrangement 
(MFA) at GATT, which related not only to cotton products but also to woolen and man-made fibre 
goods12. Although these arrangements were apparently against the spirit of GATT and free trade, the 
MFA in particular became a measure for the protection of advanced countries’ textile markets from the 
inflow of cheap goods made in the developing countries13. 
 
Thus, Japan’s textile industry lost its last hope of penetrating the large US market. Instead, Asian 
countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea not only accomplished import substitution but 
also came to capture the foreign fabric markets in the 1960s. In the 1970s, these three areas encroached 
on the domestic textile markets in the US and the Western European countries, which used to be 
important to the Japanese textile industry. Adding to the Asian Newly Industrializing Economies 
(NIEs) including Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Pakistan, which was separated from 
India in 1947, became very strong in cotton yarn exports. Moreover, from the end of the 1970s, 
mainland China’s textile industry also recovered and enjoyed an economic ‘miracle’. In the 1980s, 
particularly after the mid-1980s, as a result of the drastic appreciation of the yen, China spectacularly 
encroached on the Japanese domestic textile market. 
 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Japan did not relinquish easily her domestic textile market to 
the Asian countries, compared with the US and Western Europe, and the decline of Japan’s textile 
industry was gradual and mild. Although the industry certainly became mature and contracted overall, 
it never resulted in heavy unemployment in a short period. During the long slump, some firms were 
able to preserve their strong competitive advantage, and the others steadily succeeded in changing 
from a typical labour-intensive structure to a capital intensive one, such as chemicals. 
 
3 General conditions of the restructuring of Japanese cotton spinning companies  
3.1 Condition of the labour market 
One of the characteristics of Japan’s cotton spinning labour-force in the prewar period – the 
preponderance of young unmarried female employees – was retained in the postwar period. As Figure 
1 shows, in the decline after the 1960s, cotton-spinning companies had to reduce the numbers of 
workers. However, the feature mentioned above in addition to the inelasticity of the labour market in 
the High-Growth Era, greatly favoured the companies. Most of the female workers were teenagers and  
usually quit after a few years of working. From 1945 to the mid-1950s, there were so many young 
people who urgently required jobs soon after finishing compulsory education at the age of fifteen (after 
six years in primary school and three years in junior high school).14 But in the late 1950s, many 
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Japanese firms became worried about the shortage of such young workers in the process of rapid 
economic growth. While the average age of male workers rose from 31.3 in 1951 to 37.3 in 1961, 
female workers’ ages, after rising from 19.8 in 1951 to 22.4 in 1955, dropped from 22.4 in 1955 to 
20.8 in 1961. And while male workers’ average working years experienced a steady increase from 7.3 
in 1951 to 14.9 in 1961, the increase of female workers’ average working years was relatively slow 
from 2.7 in 1951 to 5.3 in 1955, before falling to 4.2 in 1961.15 These data indicate that a young 
female worker soon left a cotton-spinning mill, while a male worker tended to stay in a firm for a long 
period. Although many Japanese companies began to look for graduates from senior high schools in 
the 1960s, and soon suffered from the shortage of a well-educated labour force, the cotton spinning 
companies continued to search after young graduates from junior high schools from border areas 
throughout Japan. Their intellectual level gradually deteriorated, but the companies had to do it.16 In 
addition, the young female workers earnestly desired to elevate their social status in this period. Some 
wanted to complete their higher education from about 1960, when many graduates of junior high 
schools were entering senior high schools17. Therefore, many cotton spinning companies had to let the 
young workers attend senior high schools. Other female workers hoped to find interesting new jobs, 
such as working as ‘transistor girls’ in the emerging electric equipment manufacturing companies (such 
as Sony, Panasonic, and Sanyo). Thus, in the 1960s the cotton spinning companies were worried about 
the shortage of young female workers and the costs of hiring them. 
 
    However, the shortage of young female workers was gradually becoming rather favourable to the 
cotton spinning companies. Figure 1 shows that from the 1960s (at the latest, the mid-1960s), the 
textile industry lost its competitive advantage and was obliged to reduce the number of workers. 
Certainly a contributory cause was the supply side condition of the labour market: it was too difficult 
for the spinning companies to recruit easily the young workers they needed. But the companies had to 
resist recruiting them sooner or later because of the coming depression. 
 
    During the long slump from the end of 1973 to the mid-1980s, the unemployment problem 
emerged. The unemployment rate rose from 1.1 per cent in 1970, to 1.9 per cent in 1975, 2.0 per cent 
in 1980, and 2.6 per cent in 198518. In this situation, Japan’s cotton spinning companies had to reduce 
the number of workers. However, the unemployment rates in this period were never as high as in the 
recent depression caused by the collapse of the Bubble Economy, when the level reached 5.6 per cent 
in January 2002. Before the Bubble Economy, most young females could eventually find new jobs 
after a few years’ working in spinning or weaving mills. 
 
    The coal mining industry also experienced a decline after the late 1950s, but it was different from 
cotton spinning industry in the degree of its impact on the regional economies. As shown in the famous 
Miike dispute in Fukuoka Prefecture of Kyushu in 1960, serious conflicts between a firm and its 
workers often occurred, and business uncertainty resulted in the quick decline of the regional economy. 
However, such a situation did not appear in the cotton spinning firms, possibly because the collapse of 
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coal industry – precipitated by a drastic change in the government’s industrial energy policy that 
shifted from coal to petroleum – was too rapid. Another reason was in the labour force. While most 
workers in the cotton spinning were young unmarried female workers, the coal industry depended on 
middle-aged male workers, who usually had families and could not easily change their jobs due to age. 
In Table 2 we can see that, while the cotton spinning mills were dispersed in various regions, the coal 
mines were heavily concentrated in Hokkaido and Kyushu. This was another reason why the 
restructuring of Japanese spinning companies was so gradual and mild.  
 
3.2 Policy of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
In the restructuring of the Japanese textile industry, government policies, particularly the strategy of 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, were significant besides the labour market. With 
assistance from the powerful and well-organized Japan Cotton Spinners’ Association, which provided 
essential information and advice, MITI accelerated the restructuring of the textile industry. Firstly, 
MITI let the government promulgate four acts:  
(1)Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment Law (Old Textile Act: in 1956-64). The 
purpose of this act was to register all spinning machines, control their operation, abolish any excess 
weaving looms through buying them, and concentrate the production of yarn into highly effective 
facilities which could continue to absorb workers. Briefly, it was the regulation of facilities in 
expectation of the introduction of highly effective machinery19.   
 
(2)Revised Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment Law (New Textile Act: in 1964-1970). 
By this act, a textile firm was obliged to dispose of two old machines if it introduced a new one. In 
other words, it aimed at a combination of scrapping and modernization. If the firm introduced a new 
machine, the Japan Development Bank guaranteed funding at low interest rates, and with a low tax rate 
for special depreciation.  
 
(3)Temporary Measures for Structural Improvement of Specified Textile Industries Law (in 
1967-2001). In order to improve the structure of textle industry, this aimed at the modernization of 
facilities, adjustment of scale of production or administration, and planned disposal of excess 
equipment. 
 
(4)Temporary Measures for Stabilizing Specified Depressed Industries Law (in 1978-1983).  It 
ordered the industries which suffered from structual depression, including synthetics manufacturing 
and textiles spinning, to take various actions for the disposal of excess facilities, curtailment of 
operation and delivery as a premise of disposal. This act also prescribed security of funding, 
stabilization of employment, the guaranteeing of loans from a special fund, and cooperative actions 
instructed by MITI. Under this act, the spinning industry was obliged to dispose of about 60 million 
spindles by October 1979. 
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    To some extent, these acts were effective in the elimination of excess capacity.  But MITI often 
resorted to enforced cartel activities, which risked the positive effects of eliminating surplus textile 
capacity. In the prewar period the Japanese cotton spinning industry often curtailed operations. But 
such activities were spontaneously conducted at the behest of the Japan Spinners’ Association, which 
skillfully adjusted various interests among many companies20. In contrast, the postwar kankoku sotan 
and ‘depression cartel’ were led by MITI, and the ministry did not pay sufficient attention to each 
firm’s interests. The number of cotton spinning companies was 134 both in 1955 and in 1964, when 
the Old Textile Act was valid. This suggests that the excessive and bureaucratic protection by kankoku 
sotan helped the weak firms survive in this period. 
 
Secondly and conversely, MITI did not object to the free trade policy operating in the textile 
industry. It is well known that MITI adopted many policies to restrict imports and to accelerate exports 
especially in the period of the 1950s and 1960s21.  But the ministry’s aim was consistently to foster 
the emerging heavy industries, and its attitude to the textile industry may have been rather unique. 
MITI certainly recognized that the industry generally tended to decline because of the catching-up by 
developed countries. However, the ministry firmly believed that Japan’s industrial growth was mainly 
dependent on the development of heavy industries. Thus in spite of several requests from the Japanese 
cotton spinners, MITI never asked GATT to apply the MFA to Japan against the inflow of textiles 
from some Asian countries. Although, in general, the Japanese government was obedient to the US 
government in the postwar days, MITI seems to have dared to expose Japanese textiles to the world 
competition. 
 
It seems that MITI’s cartel policy let the weak firms survive. But the measures promoted by the 
ministry for eliminating excess capacity were effective and MITI’s free trade policy in textile products 
also contributed to the decrease of weak firms. As a whole, one can say that MITI’s policies towards 
Japanese textile industry would have accelerated its restructuring22.  
 
4 Strategies of cotton spinning companies 
4.1 Outlook of the leading companies 
Although the favourable condition of labour market and MITI’s policy supported the restructuring of 
postwar Japanese cotton spinning companies, strategies of the respective companies were important 
and some patterns are found in their activities. 
 
    Table 3 displays the transition of the main Japanese cotton spinners in the postwar years. Most of 
the former ten large companies, which held the highest rank until 1964, gradually declined after this 
period. However, Nisshinbo was apparently the exception. Although Nisshinbo finally decreased the 
number of spindles in 1985, it continued to move up the ranking and to increase the number of spindles 
until 1980.   In contrast, three shinbo, Tsuzukibo, Kondobo and Omikenshi, constantly increased 
their facilities and developed remarkably, especially after the end of the High-Growth Era. In 1985, 
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Tsuzukibo (and also Kondobo if the subsidiaries’ spindles were included) surpassed Toyobo with 
regard to size, and was proud of its performance. Since these Shinbo are typical family firms, only 
scattered information of these firms is available. Nevertheless, it is impressive that in the case of 
Japanese cotton spinning companies, aggressive firms were not rare even if their businesses were 
stagnating generally.  
 
    Ten large spinning firms had already vertically integrated weaving and finishing  cotton, and 
they further diversified into manufacturing various textiles such as silk, wool and rayon. Although they 
expanded in those businesses in the postwar period, a new feature is found in the case of firms engaged 
in synthetic fibre manufacturing. While this industry was deemed as ‘chemicals’ rather than ‘textiles’ 
in countries such as the US and Germany, it was treated as a textile industry in Japan (and in the UK) 
because many cotton spinners had added rayon manufacturing to their businesses in the interwar 
period23. Six of the former ten large companies (that is, Toyobo, Kanebo, Dai Nihonbo, Kurehabo, 
Daiwabo and Nittobo) were eager to participate in the fierce competition in this new business and 
invested heavily in new facilities around the 1960s. However, the other four never entered the business. 
Nisshinbo and Kurabo are examples. And three shinbo also did not enter synthetic fibre manufacturing.  
 
    Diversification of cotton spinning firms in postwar Japan was not limited to the entry into 
synthetic fibre manufacturing. In the High-Growth Era (as Table 4 shows) Kanebo, Nisshinbo, and 
Nittobo conspicuously diversified into the non-textile sector. Kanebo had already experienced 
non-textile diversification and Nittobo had diversified into special textiles before the war.  
 
4.2 Positive promoters of restructuring: Kanebo, Nittobo and Nisshinbo 
Kanebo, which was established in Tokyo in 1887,24 was quickly transformed from a textile firm to a 
large arsenal under the strong leadership of the president Shingo Tsuda between the 1930s and the end 
of the war. It collapsed after the war,25 but restarted as a company engaged in the integrated 
manufacture of cotton, silk, wool, and rayon textiles. With the saturation of textile markets in the late 
1950s, Kanebo started a radical diversification of its business. Firstly, Kanebo integrated backwards 
into apparels; secondly it engaged in the production of synthetics (nylon in 1963, polyester in 1969, 
and acrylic in 1970); and thirdly again began diversifying into non-textile products.  In 1962, Kanebo 
re-purchased its former toiletry manufacturing business and developed a network of stores to market its 
goods. The company also moved into food processing through the purchase of the Harisu Company. 
Cosmetics became a famous example of diversification, and Kanebo gradually became recognized as a 
chemical company rather than as a textile manufacturer26. 
 
    Nittobo was established in Fukushima Prefecture of Tohoku in 1923 for silk spinning. The 
founding Katakura family was world famous for its silk reeling business. But it began to worry about 
its rapid decline during the Great Depression after 1929. Restructuring the Nittobo business became a 
big challenge for the family and in 1933 it initiated the first and full-scale production of rayon staple 
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fibre in Japan. In 1937 the company merged with Nagoyabo and started cotton spinning and weaving. 
In the following year, it entered the production of rock wool and glass fibre, further diversifying 
throughout the wartime into hosiery, machinery, lumber and bricks, and mining.27 Although Nittobo 
succeeded in non-textile diversification in the postwar period, the basis of this had already been 
established before the war.  In the case of Nittobo, most of the wartime businesses were sold and 
closed, but rock wool and glass fibre were kept and became important products. In 1949, the company 
started researching acrylic, and then fibre-reinforced plastic (FRP) in 1952. In 1959, the new president 
Eiichi Shimada launched a Five-Year Plan, in which he insisted on diversification based on three 
pillars – textiles, rock wool for fire-resistance and sound absorption, and glass fibre insulation. 
Although it is difficult to determine whether or not the entry into synthetics (acrylic in 1956 and 
polypropylene in 1964) was successful, these diversifications – in addition to fine chemicals and the 
business of protection from environmental pollution – and the withdrawal from textiles continued after 
the Oil Crisis28.   
 
    We would like to pay particular attention here to Nisshinbo, which had much less historical 
experience of non-textile diversification. If the real meaning of ‘restructuring’ is the transformation of 
a business into a completely different one, Kanebo, which energetically conducted non-textile 
diversification, may be the best example of restructuring. But in this article we prefer to select 
Nisshinbo (established in 1907), as a very important example of a firm, which recognized the 
significance of restructuring in the High-Growth Era. 
 
    Nisshinbo continued to produce cotton yarn and cloth as its main products within textiles, 
maintaining since the prewar days high profits through its sales of the highest quality goods at 
competitive prices. On the other hand, in the postwar period, this company came to promote 
non-textile manufactures, such as automobile brakes, machine tools, polyurethane foams, paper 
products, and so on. Table 5 shows that Nisshinbo exceptionally increased the number of male workers 
a few years after the first Oil Crisis, though it reduced the number of female workers from the end of 
the High-Growth Era. The executives of Nisshinbo, including its renowned president Takeshi Sakurada, 
expected even in the High-Growth Era that Japanese textiles might lose their competitive advantage 
and so the future of Nisshinbo depended on developing non-textile businesses. Its Five-Year Plan of 
1960 projected that between 1959 and 1965 the percentage of textiles sales would fall from 93 per cent 
to 81 per cent and that cotton products in particular would decline from 74 per cent to 51 per cent, but 
that the percentage of non-textiles would increase from 7 per cent to 19 per cent29. This perfectly 
illustrates the strong intention to shift from textiles to non-textiles. Table 5 confirms an excellent 
performance in financial ratios: fixed assets to capital remained at less than 100 per cent after the first 
Oil Crisis. It indicates that the investment in facilities did not depend on loans but was funded from 
company capital. The ratios of capital to total assets were around 40 per cent in the High-Growth Era, 
and even after that continued to rise to about 60 per cent. The profit rates rose after the Oil Crisis. 
Although in 1975 the company was in the red, it kept stable figures thereafter. Yonekawa pointed out 
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that Nisshinbo, as well as Kurabo, did not integrate synthetic fibre manufacturing, but purchased nylon 
and polyester from another company (Teijin30) and spun good yarns by blending them with cotton 
yarn31. This is surely an important reason why Nisshinbo avoided excessive investment relating to 
synthetic fibre manufacturing. In addition to promoting non-textile diversification, Nisshinbo 
continued to cut costs and avoid excessive investment in textile manufacturing. The cost cutting 
strategy was common among the prewar Japanese cotton spinning companies32, and some shinbo also 
adhered to it.  
 
4.3 Profit seekers in textiles: three shinbo 
Three shinbo were reluctant to adopt the strategy of the non-textile diversification and clung to textiles. 
In particular, Kondobo persisted in specializing in cotton spinning and weaving. First, let us look at a 
short history of Kondobo.   
 
In 1877 Shigehachi Kondo, a cotton cloth weaver and trader, established Kondo Shoten in the 
city of Nagoya, Aichi Prefecture. In 1914, he established at Nagoya, Kondo Bosekijo (Kondobo), 
which had 4,000 spindles and 60 power looms. When Shigehachi died in 1929, his son Nobuo Kondo 
(1903-1973), who was a student of Keio Gijuku University, inherited the Kondobo business. Despite 
the serious depression, in 1931 Nobuo reaped an enormous profit through speculation in American raw 
cotton, and thus rebuilt the business of declining Kondobo. Although Nobuo once closed Kondobo in 
protest at militarism in 1943, he secretly kept the spindles and looms and energetically bought 
subsistence commodities during the wartime.  
 
In 1946, Nobuo purchased the Tsushima Mill of Howa Kogyo Company, an established textile 
machinery maker in Aichi Prefecture, and started weaving with 480 newly-installed power looms. In 
1948, Kondobo was re-established in Nagoya with 10,000 spindles and 400 power looms by Nobuo as 
shinbo. Since Nobuo actively purchased the shares of Toyoda Automatic Power Loom Company – the 
core company of Toyoda Group and of Howa Kogyo – he could secure many spinning and weaving 
machines from those companies. In 1949, Kondobo increased the capital from 1 million yen to 12 
million yen. In the following year, Nobuo acquired Toyohashi Mill of Hiyoshi Boshoku Company, and 
established Toyohashibo Company, which became a subsidiary of Kondobo with a capital of 30 
million yen and 44,400 spindles. In 1951, Nobuo established Otsubo in Nagoya with 83,840 spindles, 
and  acquired Okada Mill of Nakashichi Momen Company in Chita-gun of Aichi Prefecture and 
installed there 434 automatic power looms made by Enshu Power Loom Company. This mill later 
became Okada Mill of Kondobo. In 1952, Kondobo founded Sakurai Mill at Anjo, Aichi Prefecture, 
with 90,720 spindles. In that year, Tsushima Mill and Toyohashibo respectively increased spindles: the 
former had 62,936 spindles and the latter 60,780 spindles. In 1954, Nobuo acquired the land and 
buildings of Kato Bussan Company at Handa, Aichi Prefecture, and installed 219 power looms. In the 
same year, Tsushima Mill increased its spindles to 72,440. In 1955, Nobuo purchased Osaka Spinning 
Company, and established Ishizubo with 140 million yen and 84,800 spindles. In 1956, Sakurai Mill 
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and Tsushima Mill, respectively, increased spindles to 115,920 and to 83,780. In that year at 
Toyohashi, a second mill with 40,800 spindles was founded. And Kondobo purchased Nishiharu Mill 
of Daito Boshoku Company, installed 31,426 spindles and named it Nishiharu Mill. In 1962, Kondobo 
further purchased Sanyo Spinning Company with 53,800 spindles at Tamashima, Okayama Prefecture. 
In 1967, Kondobo established Hamamatsu Mill with 64,000 spindles, and founded Hamamatsu Second 
Mill with 48,000 spindles in the following year. In 1969, Kondobo further expanded Hamamatsu Third 
Mill with 64,000 spindles. In 1970, Nobuo again speculated on American raw cotton with over 20,000 
million yen, and received a 10 per cent profit. 
 
In 1973 when Nobuo died, his son-in-law, Sadao Kondo, succeeded to Nobuo's business.  In 
1981, Kondobo began to spin synthetic fibre, and established an unmanned spinning mill in Nagano 
Prefecture in 1982. In 1983, Kondobo officially declared itself to be ‘the department store of various 
yarns’, and completed a high-technology mill with the most advanced labour-saving automation. In 
1987, Kondobo first merged with a foreign mill in Europe, and then acquired two spinning mills in the 
US in the following year33.  
 
  A significant feature of the prewar Japanese cotton spinning companies was the strategy of 
purchasing raw cotton as cheaply as possible. Prices fluctuated violently largely due to unstable 
foreign exchange rates and also changes in raw cotton supply, because it was an agricultural product. 
Therefore buying up lots of raw cotton was risky and speculative. Nevertheless, it often brought 
enormous profits to the cotton spinning companies. Expertise in the speculation of raw cotton, such as 
that shown by Keizo Seki in Toyobo and Gengo Kodera in Dai Nihonbo, was applauded as a business 
success34.  Seki, the chairman of Toyobo, insisted that: 
 
‘The Japanese cotton industry since its inception has borne the risks of market fluctuations 
almost in their entirety. Because of this factor, many Japanese firms were abandoned 
businesses from the Meiji period to this time and day. Since most of these mills were 
transferred to new owners their facilities remained intact, but the fact remains that they 
were forced into bankruptcy or, if not bankruptcy, at least were transferred to the hands of 
new management. Because of these reasons, cotton spinning was considered an extremely 
risky industry until the time of the First World War. 
  Unlike the British or American cotton industries, the Japanese counterpart is a 
manufacturing industry, which has the misfortune of bearing huge commercial risks. It is 
not only a major manufacturing industry but it also has features and characteristics of 
financial trading. Since the industry has had to bear these enormous commercial risks, it is 
readily understandable that it was important not to remain in simple trembling fear of these 
crises, but to exploit negative economic situations, such as price fluctuations, to gain 
commercial profits. The Japanese cotton spinning industry, therefore, gave much more 
importance to the business of purchasing raw cotton. In every firm, managing executives 
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spent all their energies in studying and investigating raw cotton market conditions, in 
evolving ways, for purchasing cotton effectively and profitably. 
  During the early years of the industry’s development, these research studies had not yet 
been pursued, and the mills had no knowledge of what reasons laid behind the worldwide 
market fluctuations. Naturally, management was unavoidably carried out in a 
trial-and-error fashion on information, furnished by foreign traders; consequently, 
fluctuations in the raw cotton market also led to the failure of uncountable companies. 
Eventually, however, along with the advancing research in this field and the amassing of 
capital funds after the First World War, many of the powerful firms earned enormous 
commercial profits. And some firms actually earned greater profits from commercial 
trading rather than from manufacturing. 
 Criticisms have been lodged, it is true, that it is both improper and going too far astray 
for a manufacturing industry to aim at commercial profits. If, however, commercial risks 
are actually being borne by the mills, simply waiting in idle inaction for these dangers to 
befall would only result in the industry’s losing out in international competition. Therefore, 
it is but natural and realistic for management to exert itself to attain commercial profits. 
The important thing is that these efforts be carried out on a rational, well-laid plan, and 
essentially not be speculative. Personally, I am firmly convinced that these commercial 
profits have made enormous contributions to the growth of the Japanese cotton industry, 
along with the many practical rationalization measures carried out in the mills.35’ 
 
After the Second World War, it was said that the opportunities to reap enormous profits through 
speculative purchases of raw cotton diminished. But the case of Nobuo Kondo is an excellent 
illustration that this tradition survived even into the postwar period. 
 
    Tsuzukibo’s history shows the significance of another legacy of the prewar days. In 1928 Ryohei 
Tzuzuki (1908-1982) succeeded to a weaving mill in Chita in Aichi Prefecture, which was founded in 
1909 by his father, Kichitaro Tsuzuki. The mill had only 96 looms in 1927, but Ryohei increased the 
wide power looms for exports in 1936, becoming one of the largest weavers in Chita with 904 looms in 
1939, and establishing Tsuzuki Weaving Company with 1 million yen capital in 1940. Although he was 
obliged to lend Nakajima Aircraft Company his mill until 1945, Ryohei changed the company’s name 
to Tsuzukibo in 1948 and started cotton spinning with a capital of 30 million yen as shinbo. The 
growth of Tsuzukibo was remarkable. In 1959 the capital increased to 100 million yen. The number of 
spindles also increased from 10,000 at the beginning to 213,088 in 1955, 356,000 in 1965, 530,120 in 
1975 and 812,032 in 1982. Apparently Ryohei avoided speculation and instead pursued technological 
improvement. He developed the innovative Tsuzuki New Spinning (TNS) system, a type of super-high 
draft spinning system, and succeeded in saving labour and in automating cotton spinning. In 1972, 
Tsuzuki’s 20-count yarn spun at Izumo Mill with the TNS system was praised by Osaka Cotton 
Exchange (Osaka Sanpin Torihikijo) as equal to the products of the large spinning companies. Ryohei 
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was eager to have foreign subsidiaries, purchasing a mill in Brazil in 1960 and then six mills in the US.  
In 1979, Tsuzukibo had eleven mills in Japan and introduced air-jet looms into its weaving mills. In 
those days Tsuzukibo was proud to hold the strongest competitive advantage in the world. Tsuzukibo’s 
success seems to have been based on technological innovation and offshore production, while utilizing 
the low costs of raw cotton and labour in the USA. Cost cutting through high technology, especially, 
was an important aspect of the prewar Japanese cotton spinning. When Ryohei died in 1982, the 
Tsuzuki family inherited his business.36 Some financial data about Tsuzukibo is shown in Table 6.  
Although the assets and sales expanded remarkably, the ratios of fixed assets to capital were 
extraordinarily high, and those of capital to total assets extremely low. Tsuzukibo depended greatly on 
loans, and this may be a new feature of the postwar Japanese firms.  
 
Omikenshi was established as a peigne (a sort of silk goods) manufacturing company, Omikenmen, in 
Hikone, Shiga Prefecture,37 in 1917 by the Natsukawa family. The latter changed the name to 
Omikenshi and began silk spinning in 1919. In 1936, the company started to manufacture rayon staple 
fibre yarn, and the founder’s son, Tetsunosuke Natsukawa, began to manage the company in the 
following year. In 1941 and 1943, Omikenshi merged with four spinning or weaving firms. In 1948, 
Omikenshi restarted as shinbo and engaged in cotton spinning. After its entry into worsted yarn 
spinning in 1953, the company experienced a notorious industrial dispute in 1954. In 1956, it founded 
a rayon staple manufacturing mill at Kakogawa, Hyogo Prefecture, and had eight mills by 1965. In 
1969, Omikenshi separated the apparel division as Micalady Company, and constructed a mill at Iida 
in Nagano Prefecture in 1971. Furthermore, Omikenshi began to construct a cotton spinning mill in 
Brazil in 1973, and started another cotton spinning mill in the US in 1978. After the first Oil Crisis, 
Omikenshi reduced the number of workers and diversified into non-textiles: housing in 1976, printed 
base board manufacturing in 1983, employment agencies in 1985, though these were not so well 
promoted (see Table 4)38. Table 7 shows that the ratios of fixed assets to capital were always over 100 
per cent, and those of capital to total assets were less than 20 per cent compared with the end of the 
High-Growth Era. Omikenshi, besides Tsuzukibo, could only continue its operations through loans. 
Although the assets and sales tended to increase, Omikenshi did not expand so quickly as Tsuzukibo.  
 
    As a result, three shinbo succeeded in rapid expansion even in the period of depression after the 
Oil Crises. Kondobo’s case shows the importance of skillful speculation in textile materials. The 
significance of technological innovation can be found in Tsuzikibo’s case. Their successes depended on 
the heritage of prewar Japanese cotton spinning companies and the pursuit of cost cutting through 
technological improvement (as seen also in the case of Nisshinbo). It is certainly apparent that there 
was no restructuring in the shinbo case, and company strategies were based on the historical heritage 
of the Japanese cotton industry. 
 
4.4 Inactive restructuring: Toyobo 
Some of the former top ten spinning companies seem to have been typical mature firms of the 
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High-Growth Era. Certainly Toyobo and Unitika experienced slow or inactive restructuring. One of 
their strategies was the diversification from textiles to non-textiles, especially to chemicals39. However, 
Fujibo and Diwabo hardly changed their fully integrated production of textiles, and Shikibo clung 
alone to manufacturing rayon and cotton textiles. Nevertheless, before the High-Growth Era, all of 
them had diversified within textiles. Most of them produced not only cotton goods but also woolen and 
rayon products. In the High-Growth Era Nichibo (later Unitika), Toyobo and Daiwabo invested in 
facilities to integrate backwards into synthetic fibres such as nylon, acrylic, and polyester. Finally, at 
about the time of the first Oil Crisis, Toyobo and Unitika slowly entered such new fields as plastics and 
biotechnology. But in contrast, the remaining three companies never pursued the same strategy. The 
restructuring of these large companies was generally slow, and it might be difficult to find the proof of 
restructuring in Fujibo, Daiwabo and Shikibo. However, these large firms seem to have set the trend 
for the Japanese cotton spinning – that is, gradual decline since the 1960s. 
 
    The characteristic of inactive restructuring is well shown in the case of Toyobo. The company 
was established in 1914 through the amalgamation of Osakabo and Miebo, was world famous as one of 
the largest companies before the Second World War, and was proud of manufacturing various textile 
products with high quality and value-added before and after the war. In October 1965, Toyobo was 
operating 22 domestic mills with 19,329 workers, had 32 affiliated or subsidiary companies in Japan, 
in addition to the management of three overseas companies (Toyobo New York, Daito Boshoku 
Company in Hong Kong, and Toyobo Brazil).40 Toyobo developed such excellent technologies as 
CAS (Continuous Automated Spinning System). CAS, invented by Howa Kogyo in 1960, was the first 
system in the world which made ginned cotton directly into yarn. This technology was further diffused 
into the other Japanese spinners: NASS of Nittobo, DAS of Daiwabo, KMS of Kurehabo, KATS of 
Kurabo, and KAPS of Kanebo. Labour relations at Toyobo were excellent, partly because of sufficient 
welfare provision.41 Toyobo’s assets were plentiful (see Table 8). In short, Toyobo seems not to have 
had any problems in the early 1960s. However, this situation changed when the company started to 
produce synthetic fibres (acrylic in 1956, spandex in 1960, polypropylene in 1961 and polyester in 
1962), which needed heavy investment. In addition, in 1966 Toyobo merged with the large company 
Kurehabo, which had suffered from the depression after its entry into nylon manufacturing in 1964. 
This merger meant that Toyobo was deeply involved in the financial burden of synthetics production 
(as Table 8 suggests), although Toyobo acquired ten mills with 10,471 workers from this merger.  
 
    Toyobo‘s business of synthetics was the first step for manufacturing chemicals and the sign of 
further diversification into non-textiles. One new business was the manufacture of film for wrapping 
and of plastics. Although the introduction of polypropylene as a material for textiles in 1961 resulted in 
failure, the production of film after 1963 was successful. In 1965, polyester plastics began to be 
produced, followed by nylon in 1970. In 1968, a plastics division was established in Toyobo. The 
company had a biotechnology division in 1972, built on the site of the old pulp manufacturing 
Inuyama Mill (demolished in 1968) in Aichi Prefecture. These new businesses gradually developed in 
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Toyobo after the first Oil Shock, but the result was not dramatic. The main interest of Toyobo was still 
in high-quality textile products.42 According to Table 8, Toyobo’s profit rates after the Oil Crises were 
not too bad, but the other financial ratios worsened during the period. 
 
   The restructuring strategy of large cotton spinning companies, such as Toyobo, also explains how 
their historical legacy exercised a significant influence on their business. With the confidence borne of 
their memories of their great successes in textile manufacturing, their restructuring from textiles to 
non-textiles consequently became very lethargic. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Since the mid-1960s, the Japanese cotton spinning industry has experienced steady decline. However, 
the whole process of this decline was the synthesis of several different firm strategies within the 
industry. If we look at this process, three types of firm strategies can be found; (1) positive 
restructuring from textiles to non-textiles (Kanebo, Nittobo, and Nisshinbo); (2) adherence to textile 
manufacturing (three shinbo: Kondobo, Tsuzukibo and Omikenshi), and (3) inactive restructuring in 
some large companies (such as Toyobo). 
 
    Strategy (2) shows clearly that competitive advantage is supported by continuous efforts and 
aspirations to improve the quality of products and to reduce the costs. The framework for this strategy 
was very strong and effective by the mid-1980s. Three shinbo firmly retained speculation in raw cotton 
and cost-cutting through technical improvement that had been developed by the prewar cotton spinning 
companies, and could still enjoy a strong competitive advantage doing so. 
 
  However, even for such firms, it seems to have been impossible or very difficult to survive in an 
era of cutthroat competition, when their businesses were faced with globalization after the Plaza 
Agreement in 1985. In this new and difficult environment, strategy (1) became particularly effective, 
and the farsightedness of some companies such as Nisshinbo should be praised highly.   
 
    Finally, although strategy (3) is conservative and inactive, it seems to have set the trend for the 
Japanese cotton spinning industry’s gradual decline since the 1960s. But it may also be a historical 
inheritance of the industry. It seems that their past memory – i.e., the confidence derived from great 
success in textile manufacturing – has influenced the attitude of companies to restructuring. 
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8 Even newer spinning companies. 
9 GHQ/SCAP(ed.)(c.1951); Tawa(ed.) (1962); Abe(1992b).  
10 Nihon Boseki Kyokai (ed.). 
11 On this political conflict, see Desler et al.(1979). 
12 STA was valid for one year. LTA was abolished at the establishment of MFA. 
13 Tawa (ed.)(1979); Tsutsumi(1996). 
14 On the labour condition of the postwar textile industry, see Shimazu, (1953); Shindo, (1961); Kase 
(1997); Ishida and Murao (2000) ; Murakami et al. (2000).  
15 Tawa(ed.)(1962: 468). 
16 Kataoka,(1993). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Research and Statistics Department, the Bank of Japan (ed.). 
19 Similar acts were promulgated in fertilizer manufacturing in 1954 and coal mining in 1955. 
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20 Fletcher (1998; 2000). 
21 Johnson(1982); Sumiya(ed.)(2000).  
22 A similar argument is found in Sugihara (1997: 105). 
23 Singleton (1997). 
24  The original name was Tokyo Men Shosha, but was changed into Kanegafuchi Boseki 
Kabushiki-gaisha in 1893. 
25 Joung(1997). 
26 Kanebo Co.(ed.)(1988). 
27 ‘Kaiko 30 Nen’ Henshu Iinkai (ed.)(1953). 
28 Shashi Henshu Iinkai & Shashi Henshu Jikko Iinkai (eds.)(1979). 
29 Nisshin Boseki Kabushiki-gaisha (ed.) (1969: 793-98). 
30 Ibid. Kurabo had an affiliated company, Kuraray, which supplied Kurabo with synthetic fibres. 
31 Yonekawa (1991). 
32 Yamazaki(1997); Abe(1995; 2004). 
33 Fujino(1974); Yonekawa(1991: 112). 
34 Seki Keizo-shi Tsuikai-roku Kanko-kai (ed.)(1965: 10); Kodera Gengo O Denki Kanko-kai, (1960: 
283-303). 
35 Seki(1956: 122-23). 
36 Tsuji(1990); Yonekawa(1991, 110-12); Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha (ed.), Kaisha Sokan. 
37 The headquarters moved to the city of Osaka in 1950. 
38 Fujikawa(1967); Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha (ed.), Kaisha Nenkan; Omikenshi’s Homepage on 
Internet. 
39 The second strategy was foreign direct investment especially to Asia and Latin America in the early 
days, and later to European countries and the USA. 
40 Toyobo. 
41 Murakami, et al.(2002). 
42 Toyo Boseki Kabushiki-gaisha Shashi Henshu-shitsu(ed.)(1986). 
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